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RECENT DECISIONS
Payment of a Fee as an
"Electoral Standard" Held Violative
of Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs, Virginia residents, brought
suit to have the Virginia poll tax declared
unconstitutional. The United States Dis-
trict Court, relying on Breedlove v.
Suttles,l dismissed the complaint. The
Supreme Court, in reversing, overruled
Breedlove in part, and held that the pay-
ment of a fee as an "electoral standard"
was violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966).
Historically, most states required that
voters own a specified amount of prop-
erty.2  The framers of the Constitution
did not regard this limitation on the elec-
torate as undesirable. 3 However, during
1 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
2 See PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-46 (1918).
3 BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN
the Jeffersonian Era the alternative quali-
fication of ownership of personalty, in
lieu of realty, became prevalent. 4 At
that time, the theory that the best govern-
ment was the one which permitted the
greatest participation of its people, gained
recognition. 5 In order to implement this
theory, payment of a tax was made an
alternative to the ownership of either
personalty or realty.' Therefore, it can be
said that the poll tax was primarily enacted
as a method of encouraging voting, rather
than as a deterrent to its exercise. More-
over, it should be noted that the poll tax,
in and of itself, is not a tax on the right
to vote; rather it is a uniform, direct and
DEMOCRACY 457-61 (1915). The property qual-
ifications were justified on the theory that only
those who contributed to the support of the
government through the payment of taxes should
be allowed to vote. PORTER, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 70.
4 PORTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7-11.
5 Id. at 71.
'Note, Disenfranchisement by Means of the
Poll Tax, 53 HARv. L. REV. 645, 646 (1940).
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personal tax levied upon the person, head
or poll.I
By the time of the Civil War, property
qualifications for voting had been uni-
versally abolished, and by 1866 only
three states had any tax-paying require-
ment. 9 Following the Civil War the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments were ratified, and although these
amendments prevented outright discrim-
ination on the basis of race, their adoption
did result in ten former Confederate states
enacting poll taxes as prerequisites to the
right to vote. 10 While such taxes were
justified as devices to raise revenue and
assure voters' responsibility, 11 in reality,
they were employed to circumvent the
Civil War amendments. 12 In effect, they
tended to disenfranchise the Negro. -
Since the Civil War, it has been held
that the states may require such voting
prerequisites as residency,1" age, '5  lack
7 "Although frequently thought of as a tax on
the privilege of voting, the poll tax is actually
a head tax. In this context, 'poll' means 'head'
rather than the term customarily used to describe
a place of voting." United States v. Texas,
252 F. Supp. 234, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
0 SEYMOUR & FRARY, HOW THE WORLD VOTES
227-35 (1918).
" PORTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 111.
10 Supra note 6, at 647.
II Id. at 648.
12 See United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp.
95, 99 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
13 "A primary purpose of the 1902 Amendment
to the Texas Constitution making payment of a
poll tax a pre-condition to the right to vote was
the desire to disfranchise the Negro and the
poor white supporters of the Populist Party."
United States v. Texas, supra note 7, at 245.
1.1 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
15 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
of prior criminal convictions, 16 literacy 17
and the payment of poll taxes. 18 For
example, in Breedlove v. Suttles, a Georgia
poll tax was attacked as violative of the
equal protection clause in that it un-
reasonably exempted all women, and those
men over sixty and under twenty-one
from the tax, without exempting other
classes of people. The Court in Breedlove
rejected the equal protection argument
only as it applied to the application of the
tax. The tax itself was upheld as not
violative of the privileges and immunities
clause. The Court stated:
To make payment of poll taxes a pre-
requisite of voting is not to deny any
privilege or immunity protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Privilege of vot-
ing is not derived from the United States,
but is conferred by the State and, save as
restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments and other provisions of the
Federal Constitution, the State may con-
dition suffrage as it deems appropriate.' 9
Although the states have constitutional
authority to determine voter qualifications,
their powers are not unlimited. 20 In gen-
eral, state requirements for voting must be
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 21
In response to the Court's assertion in
Breedlove that the states had a right to
demand a poll tax as a condition prece-
16 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1890).
17 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Is Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
19 Id. at 283.
20 See Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting
Rights, 51 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1965) for a com-
prehensive discussion of limits on state author-
ity to determine voter qualifications.
21 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965);
Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va.),
aIf'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
dent to voting, a movement developed to
abolish it, at least in regard to federal
elections. Five times in ten years, the
1-louse of Representatives passed bills
abolishing poll taxes in federal elections.
22
All of these attempts were unsuccessful,
primarily because of the strong opposition
ol the Southern bloc. In addition, many
opponents of the poll tax opposed its
abolition by federal statute believing that
such abolition would unconstitutionally
interfere with the rights of the states. De-
spite this opposition, Congress in 1962
adopted the twenty-fourth amendment.
This amendment forbids the use of a poll
tax in determining voter qualifications in
any primary or other election for federal
office. It is limited in its applicability,
however, in that it does not abolish the
poll tax as a means of determining voter
qualifications with respect to purely state
elections.
As recently as March 1, 1965, the
right of a sovereign state to fix nondis-
criminatory prerequisites for voting, as
decided in Breedlove, was fully confirmed.
In Carrington v. Rash,2" the Supreme
Court held:
There can be no doubt . . . of the historic
function of the States to establish, on a
nondiscriminatory basis and in accordance
with the Constitution, other qualifications
for the exercise of the [voting] franchise.
Indeed, 'the States have long been held to
have broad powers to determine the con-
ditions under which the right of suffrage
may be exercised . .. .' In other words, the
2_ 11t CONG. REC. 9569 (daily ed. May 7,
1965) (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy). For
a complete history of these attempts, see H.R.
REP. No. 1821, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4033
(1962).
23380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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privilege to vote in a State is within the
jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exer-
cised as the State may direct, and upon
such terms as to it may seem proper, pro-
vided, of course, no discrimination is made
between individuals in violation of the
Federal Constitution.24
The attempt to resolve the problem of
poll taxes in state elections culminated in
the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. 25 Section 10 of this act, instead
of abolishing the poll tax, granted the
Attorney General the power to bring
actions in the district courts of those
states which have a poll tax to determine
whether such tax discriminates on the
basis of race or denies equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment. 26 As
a result of this grant of power, the At-
torney General sued to abolish the poll
tax in Alabama, Texas and Virginia.
In United States v. Alabama,.27 the first
case to construe the statute, the court
held that an Alabama poll tax was
violative of the fifteenth amendment since
its purpose and eflect were to abridge and
deny the Negroes' right to vote. The
whole history of the state poll tax statute,
according to the court, was tainted with
the intent to disenfranchise the Negro. 28
This, coupled with the policies of the
Alabama state government, showed that
the total effect was to prevent the Negro
from voting. 9
In United States v. Texas,a" a poll tax
2.1 Id. at 91.
25 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
2679 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(b) (1965).
27 252 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
28 d. at 98-99.
291 Id. at 101.
30 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
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statute was declared unconstitutional, not
because it was violative of the equal pro-
tection clause, or of the fifteenth amend-
ment, but because the payment of the
poll tax as a condition to the right to vote
was an unjustified restriction on the rights
guaranteed under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether
the poll tax was violative of the equal pro-
tection clause as an undue discrimination
against the poor since it found the tax
invalid under the due process clause.31
The court asserted that the right to vote
was so rooted in the people that to
so condition or deny this right would be
against the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which are at the base
of all our civil and political institutions.
2
In the instant case, the Supreme Court
held the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional
as violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court reasoned that the poll tax, by
making affluence an "electoral standard,"
is an example of invidious discrimination,
since such a standard bears no relation to
a person's qualification to vote.3 '  The
Court compared the requirements of
a fee to that of homesite and occu-
pation, and stated that neither affords a
31 Id. at 247.
32 Id. at 255. The Supreme Court itself has
called the right to vote the most important
means of participating in our democratic society.
"No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which . . . we
must live. Other rights, even the most basic,
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
33 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
permissible basis for distinguishing be-
tween qualified voters within the state.34
It was recognized that a state had a legiti-
mate interest in determining voter qualifi-
cations; however, to introduce wealth or
payment of a fee would be a capricious
or irrelevant factor amounting to a
violation of the equal protection clause.35
To the extent that Breedlove sanctioned
the use of a poll tax as a "prerequisite of
voting," it was explicitly overruled.", The
Court indicated that it would, through its
re-examination of the equal protection
clause, continue its policy of closely
scrutinizing and carefully confining class-
ifications which might invade or restrain
fundamental rights and liberties asserted
under the equal protection clause. 7
Mr. Justice Black in his dissent criti-
cized the majority on two grounds. He
asserted that from an historical approach
and from previous decisions of the Court
the interpretation that the poll tax is un-
constitutional under the equal protection
clause is erroneous. He reasoned that
since no racial discrimination could be
shown and since no applicable constitu-
tional amendment had been enacted, the
Breedlove rule should be followed. Ac-
cording to Mr. Justice Black, the poll tax,
although discriminatory, is merely a state
qualification which does not violate the
equal protection clause and may be justi-
fied as both a reasonable and rational
exercise of the states' power to determine
voter qualifications."" More precisely:
3-' Id. at 667.
35 Id. at 668.
36 Id. at 669.
'I Id. at 670.
3S Id. at 670-75.
The equal protection cases carefully ana-
lyzed boil down to the principle that dis-
tinctions drawn and even discriminations
imposed by state laws do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause so long as these
distinctions and discriminations are not
'irrational,' 'irrelevant,' 'unreasonable,'
'arbitrary,' or 'invidious. 19
As a second reason for dissenting, Mr.
Justice Black objected to what he termed
the old "natural-law-due-process formula"
to justify striking down state laws as
violative of the equal protection clause.40
He strongly objected to the use of either
the due process clause or the equal pro-
tection clause as a blank check to alter
the meaning of the Constitution. Such
broad changes, he believed, should be
achieved only through the constitutional
amendment process.4 1 He concluded that
so long as the majority could not show
the tax to be "irrational," "irrelevant,"
"unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "invi-
dious," he could not declare such a tax
to be unconstitutional on the basis of a
personal hostility to it.4 2
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart, also dissented. He asserted
that, by this use of the equal protection
clause, the Court had departed from the
traditional applications of that clause. 4
According to Mr. Justice Harlan, the
test of the equal protection clause is
whether a particular classification can be
deemed to be founded on a rational state
policy. He asserted that a rational basis
for Virginia's poll tax as a voting qualifica-
tion can be found in the argument that it
3. Id. at 673-74.
40 Id. at 675.
41 Id. at 675-76.
42 Id. at 677.
43 Id. at 681.
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promotes civic responsibility by "weed-
ing out those who do not care enough
about public affairs to pay $1.50 . . . for
the exercise of the franchise." 11
The instant case, by overruling Breed-
love, has abolished any tax imposed as a
qualification on the right to vote. The
Court, in the elimination of the poll tax,
did not base its decision on discrimination
as had been done by the district court in
Alabama. In fact, in the instant case, no
history of any discriminatory practice was
even alluded to by the majority although
discrimination was the principal reason
for the adoption of the state's poll tax
requirement.4 5
The Court also stepped beyond the
decision in Texas in that it answered the
question which the district court had left
unanswered and asserted that the poll
tax does deny the poor equal protection
because of the burden which its payment
imposes.
Although the case is limited to poll
taxes, it would seem that the Court, by
its use of the equal protection clause, can
condemn as unconstitutional any standard
which is felt to be invidiously discrim-
inatory. The question which arises is
how far the Court will go in defining
"invidious discrimination." Although the
Court denies that it is setting its own
standard as to what the equal protection
clause should be, the extremely broad
language of the majority would seem to
indicate a silent intent to allow for even
broader interpretations in the future.
Whether other state voting regulations
4'Id. at 685.
45 111 CONG. RFc. 9582 (daily ed. May 7, 1965).
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will be invalidated under the equal pro-
tection clause remains to be seen. In
any event, it would appear that future
attempts by the states to exercise their
Sit-in Conduct Held
Constitutionally Protected
The five Negro petitioners had entered
a small regional library1 in Louisiana with
the intention of staging a sit-in. Peti-
tioner Brown requested a particular book.
The librarian, after a search, informed
the petitioner that the library did not
contain the book desired, but that she
would arrange to obtain it for him from
the state library. After this service had
been rendered, the five petitioners were
requested to vacate the library by the
librarian, her supervisor, and finally by
the sheriff. When petitioners refused to
leave they were arrested and later con-
victed of violating Louisiana's "breach of
peace" statute.' The United States Su-
preme Court, in a five to four decision,
reversed the conviction and held that
petitioners' conduct was constitutionally
protected under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966).
In 1865 slavery was ended in this
1 The library in question was a local service
facility without any reading room. The room
where the events took place was quite small,
containing two tables and one chair (excluding
those used by the librarians), a stove, a card
catalogue, and open bookshelves. Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 135 (1966).
2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1965).
power over voting qualifications will be
carefully scrutinized and possibly severely
limited by that uncertainty which often
accompanies such a broad interpretation.
country by the ratification of the thirteenth
amendment. Subsequently, the fourteenth
amendment granted to all Americans equal
protection of the laws, the privileges and
immunities of citizens, and guaranteed
that no state would deprive any person of
his life, liberty or property without due
process of law. In addition, the fifteenth
amendment guaranteed all citizens the
right to vote without regard to race or
color.4 These amendments, followed by
potentially powerful civil rights legisla-
tion,5 apparently gave the Negro a massive
array of federally protected rights. These
rights, however, were soon limited by
decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
In 1872, in the Slaughter-House Cases,
the fourteenth amendment was interpreted
as protecting from state action only the
"privileges and immunities" conferred up-
on one as a citizen of the United States.7
Thus, those rights which derived from
state citizenship were deemed not pro-
tected from state action by the fourteenth
:i U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
5E.g., 14 Stat, 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1964); 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1964); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964).
r83 U.S. 36 (1872).
See id. at 78-80.
